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Transcranial direct current stimulation 
of the motor cortex in waking resting 
state induces motor imagery 
Jana Speth, Clemens Speth, Trevor A. Harley
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Abstract 
This study investigates if anodal and cathodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of 
areas above the motor cortex (C3) influences spontaneous motor imagery experienced in the 
waking resting state. A randomized triple-blinded design was used, combining 
neurophysiological techniques with tools of quantitative mentation report analysis from 
cognitive linguistics. The results indicate that while spontaneous motor imagery rarely occurs 
under sham stimulation, general and athletic motor imagery (classified as athletic disciplines), is 
induced by anodal tDCS. This insight may have implications beyond basic consciousness research. 
Motor imagery and corresponding motor cortical activation have been shown to benefit later 
motor performance. Electrophysiological manipulations of motor imagery could in the long run 
be used for rehabilitative tDCS protocols benefitting temporarily immobile clinical patients who 
cannot perform specific motor imagery tasks – such as dementia patients, infants with 
developmental and motor disorders, and coma patients. 
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Introduction 
Motor imagery forms an integral part of human consciousness. Such mental representations of 
movement without analogous body movement (Guillot & Collet, 2005) occur regularly and 
spontaneously, especially in states with naturally high motor cortical activation, such as rapid eye 
movement (REM) sleep (Desseilles et al., 2011, Dresler et al., 2011, Porte and Hobson, 1996 and 
Speth et al., 2013), and have been associated with motor learning and rehearsal (Hobson, 2009 
and Walker et al., 2002). Motor simulation tasks can also be purposefully used in waking to 
benefit specific motor performances (Arora et al., 2011, Driskell et al., 1994, Jackson et al., 2006, 
Meister et al., 2004 and Schuster et al., 2011). 
Studies revealing the strong relationship between motor simulations and motor system 
activation, functioning independently of motor performance (Abbruzzese et al., 1999, Bonnet et 
al., 1997, Decety, 1996, Fadiga et al., 1999, Jeannerod, 1995, Jeannerod, 2001, Porro et al., 1996 
and Schnitzler et al., 1997) have given rise to the hope that motor imagery will provide a backdoor 
to the motor system after impairments (Jackson et al., 2001, Lehéricy et al., 2004 and Sharma et 
al., 2006). To this end, motor imagery has been shown in neurofeedback task paradigms to 
increase regional cortical activation: long-term effects of increased activation of motor areas 
involving neural circuitries associated with motor skill learning can last up to several days (Kober 
et al., 2014 and Yoo et al., 2008). We can assume that motor imagery and motor system activation 
form a functional unit that, if activated in the resting state, serves the purpose of training motor 
performance. 
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) offers a way to manipulate cortical 
excitability. As it is non-invasive, has limited side effects, and is more comfortable and less 
irritating for participants than other brain stimulation techniques, tDCS can benefit the study of 
spontaneous brain activity and consciousness. Anodal tDC stimulation has been shown to 
increase the excitability of the motor cortex, while cathodal stimulation decreases its excitability 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). TDCS can thus influence motor performance (Pavlova, Kuo, Nitsche, & 
Borg, 2014), and facilitate motor learning (Prichard, Weiller, Fritsch, & Reis, 2014). While the 
effects of tDCS in conjunction with motor imagery have been studied before (Foerster et al., 2013 
and Quartarone et al., 2004), those studies used motor imagery as an independent variable by 
actively asking participants to imagine motor movements, and measured effects only on 
dependent physiological variables. To our knowledge, however, no study reports the direct 
influence of tDCS of motor areas on phenomenology, such as the experience of motor imagery. 
The AIM model of consciousness proposes that the motor imagery perceived in REM sleep 
dreams is a direct result of higher motor cortical activation (Hobson, 2009 and Hobson et al., 
2000). TDCS may also enable us to manipulate motor cortical excitability in order to test whether 
there is a strong causal relationship between activation of the motor system and spontaneous 
motor imagery as it occurs in REM sleep dreaming, or through the use of mental motor rehearsal 
techniques in waking. 
The present study investigates if anodal and cathodal tDCS of the motor cortex elevates 
the degree of spontaneous motor imagery in the waking resting state. We expect anodal, but not 
cathodal tDCS, to induce spontaneous motor imagery compared with sham stimulation. Such tDC 
stimulation protocols could in the long run benefit especially such temporarily immobile clinical 
patients who cannot perform specific motor imagery tasks, such as mentally disabled patients, 
dementia patients, patients with psychological disorders, infants with developmental and motor 
disorders, and coma patients. 
 Method 
To study motor imagery in the waking resting state, along with the possibility of its enhancement, 
mentations are investigated as conceived in a no-task-no-response setting (Vaitl et al., 2005) 
under anodal, cathodal, and sham stimulation. Motor imagery was measured with a quantitative 
linguistic tool: motor agency analysis. Agency analysis has been used in previous studies, and has 
been shown to be a reliable tool ( Speth et al., 2015 and Speth et al., 2013). Study participants 
were computer randomized to the stimulation conditions. The current study is triple-blind in so 
far as neither the participant delivering the report, nor the investigator recording it, or the raters 
analysing it, knew the stimulation condition. The study was approved by the University Research 
Ethics Committee (UREC) of the University of Dundee, and conducted in the Dundee Sleep and 
Consciousness Laboratory. 
Participants 
Participants were male and female undergraduate volunteers. Participants were issued an 
information sheet on the experimental procedure, and were told that they would be asked to 
answer a series of questions towards the end of the testing. No further details were given on the 
specific purpose of the experiment in order to prevent participants from engaging in 
metacognitions and the planning of their verbal report or other interview responses during the 
mentation period. Participants were assured however that they would be able to refuse answers, 
without further explanation, at any time. Participants were informed about the possibility that 
they would feel a slight tingling sensation during the tDC stimulation. Participants with diagnoses 
of epilepsy or severe migraines would have been excluded from the study, along with participants 
who reported a history of allergic skin reactions. Written informed consent was obtained from all 
participants prior to the experiment. 
Questionnaires 
A short open-answer questionnaire assessed participants’ age, gender, native language, 
nationality, education, medication, as well as the time of last caffeine consumption, the general 
level of caffeine consumption, physical exercise on the day of testing, amount of physical exercise 
per week, and meditation experience. Handedness was tested with a short version of the 
Edinburgh handedness inventory (EHI-short; Veale, 2014). 
Experimental design 
The experiment was conducted in a low-stimulus environment. After the investigator had 
attached the tDCS and EEG electrodes, participants were asked to rest in a reclining chair while a 
simple EEG recording of their brain would be conducted. Participants were asked to keep their 
eyes closed and their body movements to a minimum in order to promote the accuracy of the 
EEG. Participants were informed that the investigator would be in an adjacent room and return 
after twenty minutes. The investigator started the recording and the tDCS from the adjacent room. 
After twenty minutes, the investigator returned and without further ado asked participants the 
standardized question “What did you see, hear, feel, do in your imagination?” while offering a 
voice recorder. The investigator kept verbal, mimic, and gestural interaction with participants to 
a minimum while the report was being delivered. When participants stopped reporting, without 
showing the wish to continue, the investigator would stop the recording. Only after participants 
had finished would the investigator remove the EEG and tDCS equipment. The reports were later 
transcribed and handed to three blind, independent raters for the motor agency analysis. 
 TDCS 
The tDC stimulation was carried out with a NeuroConn DC-Stimulator Plus (neuroConn GmbH, 
Illmenau, GER). The positioning of the tDCS rubber electrodes was the same for all three testing 
conditions. A smaller stimulation electrode (25 cm2) was applied at C3, while a larger (35 cm2) 
reference electrode was positioned contralaterally between Fp2 and F8. 
A stimulation strength of 1.5 mA was applied. In order to minimize the perception of current by 
the participant, the current was linearly ramped up over the course of 15 s at the beginning, and 
ramped down over the course of 15 s at the end of the session. In order to avoid adverse effects 
from a sudden increase in skin resistance, the tDC stimulation would automatically stop above an 
impedance of 20 kΩ. In the sham condition, current was ramped up and immediately ramped 
down again in order to promote a perception of current onset similar to the stimulation condition. 
 
EEG 
In order to confirm that participants remained awake during the testing interval (as opposed to 
entering sleep stage 1), their cortical activity was monitored with a 31 channel EEG device 
(QuickAmp, Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, GER). An electrode cap fixated the electrodes 
according to the international 10–20 electrode positions. The electrode position C3 was not 
recorded, as it was taken up by the tDC stimulation electrode. Ag/AgCl ring electrodes were used. 
Participants’ scalps were prepared with a 70 % isopropyl solution and an abrasive electrolyte gel 
(Abralyt LIGHT) in order to achieve impedance levels below 10 kΩ. In line with the AASM 
guidelines (Iber, Ancoli-Israel, Chesson, & Quan, 2007), EOG electrodes were placed 2 cm left and 
beneath the left eye, and 2 cm right and above the right eye, and two EMG electrodes were applied 
to the chin. 
 
Quantitative linguistic analysis of mentation reports 
The raters were asked to quantify specific linguistic references to motor imagery in the 
participants’ mentation reports. The linguistic tool used for the rating is based on linguistic theta 
theory (Gruber, 2001, Reinhart, 2002 and Reinhart and Siloni, 2005). A first version of the tool 
has been used successfully to link degrees of linguistic references to motor imagery in mentation 
reports with characteristic motor cortical activation of states of consciousness (Speth et al., 
2013). In a modified version, the tool has been used to investigate differences in degrees of 
auditory verbal hallucinations across states of consciousness (Speth et al., 2015). 
The current study measures motor imagery by means of linguistic motor agency analysis. 
In linguistic theta system theory, the initiator of an event takes on a specific thematic (theta) role 
within a sentence or phrase. He or she is the agent who performs an action. In the phrase “Mimi 
throws a ball”, Mimi is the agent. The agent is defined through his or her relationship to the 
predicate of a phrase: he or she is performing the action described by the predicate. Mimi is the 
one who is doing something. The agent is described by a noun phrase, but the agent is not 
necessarily congruent with the grammatical subject. Consider the following phrases, where Mimi 
is the agent in both (i) and (ii), but the syntactic subject only in the active version (i). 
 
(i)    Mimi opens the box. 
(ii)    The box is opened by Mimi. 
 
As participants were reporting on their mental experience, it was expected that raters would 
encounter instances of moderated-simulated agency. Moderated-simulated agency describes 
how the agent engages in explicitly mental processes concerned with simulated motor action. 
Consider for example the phrase “I imagined myself running”. In this instance, “I” is the agent of 
the verb phrase “imagined…”, which moderates the explicitly mental, simulated activity of 
“running”. Raters were advised to count instances of moderated-simulated agency as normal 
instances of simulated motor activity. 
 
The following phrases, (iii), (iv), and (v), are samples from mentation reports. They contain 
instances of normal simulated motor agency as well as moderated-simulated motor agency: 
 
(iii)    And he was coming home and like holding a bunch of flowers I guess. 
(iv)    I imagined myself running. 
(v)    I think I was… I think I walking along a corridor. 
 
Doubly or vaguely moderated action verbs however cannot be recognized as simulated agency. 
The following phrase (vi) for example (double moderation emphasized in bold print) would not 
be counted as agency, as its interpretation does not necessarily entail that the person simulated 
actively carrying out the tasks. 
 
(vi)    “thinking about what I needed to do” 
 
Note that the following example (vii) does contain two motion verbs, but no agency (as there is 
no agent even remotely connected to the motion verbs): 
 
(vii)    Um, just like running through like a film, and stuff that I’d watched recently and stuff like 
that… thought of things to do on the bicycle. 
 
Raters were instructed to count repetitions separately. The following sample (viii) contains two 
instances of simulated agency: 
 
(viii)    I was going along… I think I was going home with my friends. 
 
Raters were asked to always discriminate between simulated and actual motor agency. They were 
instructed to count simulated agency but ignore obvious instances of actual motor agency. The 
following example (ix) refers to actual agency, but contains no instance of simulated motor 
agency: 
 
(ix)    I was moving around in this chair, just wanted to lift my head and stuff… scared that the 
electrodes would come off though… 
 
Raters were instructed to count instances of agency that are described by seemingly static verb 
phrases such as “to be” if they can be linked to simulated agency rather than static events, as in 
example (x): 
 
(x)    … how I’d be in the swimming pool, you know… 
 
Raters were asked to specify the perspective of each instance of simulated motor agency as that 
of the experimental subject in their imagination (first person singular, first person plural), of 
mentations on the temporarily absent researchers which occur in experimental settings (second 
person singular and plural), or as simulated motor agency of non-present real persons or 
imaginative characters (third person singular and plural). Ratings would thus discriminate 
between simulated agency experienced from a distinct first, second, or third person point of view 
as in example (xi), and participants’ experiences of witnessing motor imagery as though in a 
movie or slideshow as in example (xii): 
 
(xi)    I imagined skiing… I was skiing down a mountain. 
(xii)   I had this vision of rugby I think… 
 
Raters were asked to count as normal simulated agency such instances of apparently inhibited 
motor agency as in example (xiii), which entail the planning, attempt, or beginning of simulated 
action: 
 
(xiii)    I tried to run. 
 
As the English language comprises a vast number of movement metaphors and idioms, it needed 
to be ensured that those simulated motor agencies that describe distinct and intense simulations 
of motor movement would be captured. For example, the phrase “Mimi walked to Rome” more 
clearly describes physical action than “Mimi went to Rome”. Raters were thus asked to classify 
motor simulations as athletic disciplines where applicable (compare 
http://www.olympic.org/sports, https://www.theworldgames.org/the-sports/sports). 
 
Report rating instructions 
All raters were asked to rate all reports. Along with a hard copy of the reports, raters were handed 
an instruction manual which explained how to identify instances of simulated motor agency. The 
instruction manual contained the definitions of simulated motor agency that are given above. 
Raters were asked to use their best judgement and decide how to deal with particular phrases, as 
not all possible verbal references to simulated motor agency possible in natural speech can be 
pre-defined. 
Statistical analyses 
Nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis tests were conducted to ensure that the randomly assigned 
groups did not differ with respect to gender, native language, nationality, education, experience 
with meditation, time of last caffeine consumption, physical exercise prior to testing, and the 
amount of physical exercise per week. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to 
test for differences in age and laterality scores of the EHI-short between the experimental groups. 
Identified instances of motor agency were aggregated for every report, separately for 
every rater. By calculating the mean rating of all raters for each report, one single rating value 
was assigned to each report. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test for differences in the 
number of identified agencies between stimulation conditions and sham tDCS. Scheffé’s method 
was used for pairwise post hoc analyses. The athletic qualities of the motor agencies were 
analysed in the same way. 
In order to test for changes in the perspective from which motor simulations were 
perceived between stimulation conditions, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for agency 
perspective (first, second, and third person) was conducted. To correct this effect for the overall 
changes in motor agency, the number of motor agencies was used as a covariate. Fisher’s least 
significant difference (LSD) tests were used post hoc. 
To ensure that changes in motor agency are not simply a result of changes in report length, 
a one-way ANOVA was conducted to test for differences in the word count of the reports from 
different stimulation conditions. Further, an ANCOVA tested changes in the number of motor 
agencies between stimulation conditions with the word count of each report as covariate. Fisher’s 
LSD tests were used post hoc. A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve was calculated, and 
the area under the curve (AUC) was used to assert the predictive value of motor agency and 
athletic motor agency to determine the stimulation condition. 
 
Results 
Reports from 28 participants were collected, 7 under anodal tDCS, 8 under cathodal tDCS, and 13 
under sham stimulation. The participants did not differ significantly between the experimental 
groups with respect to their age, gender, native language, nationality, education, medication, time 
of last caffeine consumption, general level of caffeine consumption, physical exercise on the day 
of testing, amount of physical exercise per week, experience in meditation, and their EHI-short 
laterality score. Analyses of the EEG data confirmed that no participants had transitioned into 
sleep stage 1 during the testing period. 
On average the raters identified 1.43 simulated motor agencies per report (SD = 2.30). 
Linguistic samples from reports collected from anodal tDCS and sham can be seen in Table 1. The 
agreement between the three raters was high, with Cronbach’s α = .98. The prevalence of 
simulated motor agency differed significantly between the three stimulation conditions (F(2, 25) 
= 5.93, p = .008, η2 = .322). Post-hoc analyses indicate that there were significantly more instances 
of simulated motor agency under anodal tDCS as compared to sham stimulation (p = .011). The 
level of athletic motor agency also differed significantly between the stimulation conditions (F(2, 
25) = 4.44, p = .023, η2 = .263). There were more athletic motor agencies (classified as athletic 
disciplines) under anodal tDCS than under sham stimulation (p = .023). Compare Figure 1. 
 
Table 1: Report samples from anodal tDCS and sham. The type of agency (athletic, non-athletic) and the grammatical 
perspective (first, second, third) from which the agency is reported are given. 
 sample 
Agency type and  
grammatical perspective 
Anodal tDCS I imagined walking, what else did I do? I imagined running 
and I imagined skiing at various points... 
 
3 x athletic first person 
 It turned into a bit of Alice and Wonderland, the queen of 
hearts, one of the guys was painting roses red, fell over, and 
dropped the red paint on the ground… 
 
3 x non-athletic third person  
 I uh, I snowboarded for a bit, I kicked about, I was uhh back 
home for a bit walking about like […] my old 
neighbourhood. Uhh, I did a lot of 360’s, I spun a lot in my 
head, I dunno… 
 
4 x athletic first person 
1 x non-athletic first person 
 Uh… I dunno. I imagined myself skiing, not really much 
else… 
 
1 x athletic first person 
 Umm… I was fighting people as a ninja at one point… 1 x athletic first person 
 
 I was in a room, well it had like arches and bricks, and it 
was all red, and I was dancing with my friends, which was 
quite weird… 
 
1 x athletic first person 
Sham And in my imagination I thought… I thought a lot. About I 
dunno… like I was thinking about my dissertation in my 
head like a sad person… 
 
N/A 
 Yeah ok… things that I saw… were lots of kinda like 
kaleidoscope like patterns, that kinda, you know, things that 
I saw. […] Umm… patterns (unclear) shape birds, beaks 
would open and then turn to like weird rivers. I have a very 
weird imagination anyway, but (unclear) fairy, I did take 
note as I was sitting here, thinking these are really weird 
things that are happening, strange mickey mouse things and 
umm… 
 





 Figure 1 Mean number of instances of motor agency and athletic motor agency per report after anodal, cathodal, or sham 
stimulation of C3. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. ∗p > .05, ∗∗p < .01. 
The first person perspective of agency differed significantly between the stimulation 
conditions (F(2, 24) = 4.70, p = .019, partial η2 = .281). There were more instances of motor 
agency experienced from the first person perspective (singular and plural) in the anodal tDCS 
condition than in the sham condition (p = .007), and more in the cathodal than in the sham 
condition (p = .034). Differences for second person (singular and plural) between the stimulation 
conditions were not quite significant (F(2, 24) = 3.34, p = .052). The third person perspective 
(singular and plural) differed significantly between the stimulation conditions (F(2, 24) = 5.45, p 
= .011, partial η2 = .312). There were more motor agencies for the third person (singular and 
plural) under sham than in the anodal condition (p = .004) and the cathodal condition (p = .031). 
The number of words per report did not differ significantly between the conditions (F(2, 
25) = 2.125; p = .14). The prevalence of simulated motor agency still differed significantly when 
correcting for the length of the report (F(2, 24) = 4.36, p = .024, partial η2 = .266). There were 
more references to motor agency in reports from anodal tDCS than from sham (p = .007). 
The ROC curve for the number of motor agencies and athletic motor agencies predicting 
the anodal tDCS condition can be seen in Fig. 2. For the number of motor agencies as predictor for 
anodal tDCS versus sham, the AUC was very large (AUC = .907) and statistically significant (p = 
.003). The AUC for the number of athletic motor agencies as predictor for the stimulation 
condition was not significant (AUC = .67; p = .219). 
 Figure 2: ROC curve for references to motor imagery and athletic motor imagery as predictor of anodal tDCS of C3. 
Discussion 
This study set out to investigate the effects of tDCS on human consciousness, aiming to compare 
the degree of motor imagery in the anodal, cathodal, and sham tDCS conditions. An implicit 
method (third person analysis of first person mentation reports) was used to measure motor 
imagery. Anodal tDCS is known to increase motor cortical excitability (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). 
The present findings now indicate that anodal, but not cathodal, tDCS of areas above the motor 
cortex (C3) additionally increases motor imagery in general, as well as imagery of athletic motor 
movements (classified as athletic disciplines). 
As cathodal stimulation of the motor cortex is known to decrease excitability (Nitsche & 
Paulus, 2000), one might expect cathodal stimulation to decrease motor imagery compared to 
sham stimulation. However, the present findings tentatively indicate a (non-significant) increase 
in motor imagery under cathodal stimulation. Future studies on the effect of cathodal stimulation 
on motor imagery might be able to determine whether, and how, cathodal stimulation can lead to 
an increase or decrease in motor imagery. It has to be considered however that under sham 
stimulation, a mean of 0.15 references to motor imagery was found per report. It appears difficult 
to decrease any further a phenomenon that almost never occurs in the first place – so that this 
basement effect could prevent future studies from investigating an additional decrease in motor 
imagery via cortical cathodal stimulation. 
To account for the fact that the English language comprises a remarkably large number of 
manner-of-motion verbs, as well as motion and movement metaphors and idioms, raters of the 
mentation reports were asked to differentiate between general versus athletic motor imagery. 
The rationale was that this would allow for a rough distinction between weaker and stronger 
motor agency, while keeping the room for interpretation, as well as the cognitive load for the 
raters of the mentation reports, to a minimum. The tool would, for example, treat the idiom “going 
somewhere” as a possible linguistic artefact (as it does not necessarily denote motor imagery), 
but pick up “walking somewhere” (which more clearly describes athletic motor imagery). It is 
entirely possible that this objectivity was bought at the cost of a few cases where the tool did not 
pick up strong motor imagery, such as for example chopping vegetables. Both general motor 
imagery and athletic motor imagery could differentiate between stimulation conditions. 
The present data further suggest that the increase in linguistic references to motor 
imagery is not an artifact of a general increase in motor speech output: The length of the report 
did not differ between stimulation conditions. After controlling for the word count of each report, 
anodal stimulation still resulted in significantly more reported motor imagery than sham 
stimulation. The control for word count has been criticized in the study of free mentation reports 
of dreams (Hobson et al., 2000), as some meaningful variables may not be independent of report 
length. In the present study however, it may be appropriate to control for report length, as verbal 
reporting involves motor action, and could have been influenced by the stimulation of motor 
areas. The present effect is robust to the control for word length. 
The Receiver Operating Characteristic indicates that motor imagery as quantified by 
linguistic motor agency analysis has an excellent accuracy in differentiating between anodal tDCS 
and sham stimulation (AUC = .907). Motor agency is a better predictor than athletic motor agency 
for stimulation conditions. 
It is further noted that motor imagery tended to be experienced more often from a first 
person, and less often from a third person point of view, in the two tDC stimulation conditions, as 
compared to the sham condition. These results tie in with the observation by Sirigu and Duhamel 
(2001) that first person motor simulations are more likely to involve motor activation than third 
person motor simulations. 
Raters show an almost absolute agreement in quantifying motor agency in the reports. 
The inter-rater reliability achieved by the raters in the present study, without intense training or 
a psycholinguistic background, indicates that the tool of quantitative linguistic agency analysis is 
an easy-to-apply, reliable tool to measure simulated motor actions as they get expressed in the 
language of mentation reports. While the present study computer-randomized the participants 
to experimental groups and tested for differences in the groups that could potentially influence 
motor imagery (age, gender, caffeine consumption, meditation experience, physical exercise, 
etc.), a replication of the experiment, preferably with a within-subject design and with a larger 
number of participants, will strengthen the claim that brain stimulation affects motor imagery. 
Further research will also show if this finding extends to other states of consciousness, such as 
REM sleep dreaming. 
So far, it can be concluded that references to motor imagery rarely occur in reports of 
default waking resting state mentation, and that anodal stimulation does not only moderate and 
increase motor imagery, but serves to generate motor imagery that would not occur 
spontaneously in waking resting state. The present study may be a first step towards establishing 
which protocol for cortical tDC stimulation induces which kinds of motor simulations – research 
that could be beneficial for targeted clinical applications. 
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